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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT E. CONGER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
TEL TECH, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890231-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon 
this Court by Utah Constitution Article VIII, §§ 3 and 5, Rules 
3, 4, and 4A of Utah Supreme Court, and Rule 4A of Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
This appeal is from a jury trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, resulting in an 
adverse jury verdict against plaintiff/appellant Robert E. 
Conger and in favor of defendant/appellee Tel Tech, Inc. 
Judgment on the jury verdict was entered February 8, 1989, and 
Conger timely filed his appeal on March 8, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented by this appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred by directing a 
verdict on plaintiff's strict liability theory at the close of 
all the evidence of the case, and instructing the jury only on 
plaintiff's negligence theory. 
2. Whether the sale and installation of a "spray 
ball" cleaning system on the milk tanker on which plaintiff was 
subsequently injured properly can be the basis of a strict 
liability theory. 
3. Whether the absence of a safety feature or 
device, in this case, an adhesive grit paper applied to the 
tanker skin which enables the user of the cleaning system to 
approach and use the spray balls safely, constitutes a proper 
basis for the imposition of strict liability, 
4. Whether the trial court's admonition after the 
close of all evidence that the jury should disregard evidence 
and testimony relating to the unsafe or defective nature of the 
spray balls prejudiced plaintiff's negligence claim such that a 
new trial is necessitated on plaintiff's negligence theory. 
5. Whether on remand the issue of plaintiff's 
negligence is foreclosed by the jury finding that plaintiff was 
not negligent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW. 
This case arose from severe personal injuries suffered 
by plaintiff on January 1, 1981 in the course of his duties as 
an employee at the Meadow Gold facility in Salt Lake City. 
Second Amended Complaint, R. 155-159. On that day, plaintiff 
was walking along the top of a stainless steel milk tanker to 
connect a hose to a spray ball attachment on the* top of the 
tanker, for the purpose of cleaning out the inside of the milk 
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tanker. When Mr. Conger stepped over a hatch and onto the 
smooth steel skin as he approached the spray ball, he slipped 
and fell to the ground, sustaining spinal cord injuries which 
have left him permanently and totally disabled. Id. 
Plaintiff's second amended complaint filed April 18, 
1984, alleged negligence by Tel Tech, and negligent conduct on 
the part of a number of other defendants.1 Id. Plaintiff's 
claims against Tel Tech were dismissed by summary judgment of 
the district court, which judgment was reversed by this Court 
on May 12, 1988. Opinion of Utah Court of Appeals, Case 
No. 870129-CA, R. 647-649. 
After remand from this Court, Tel Tech's counsel took 
the deposition of plaintiff's expert, Carl Eilers, on September 
29, 1988. Mr. Eilers voiced his opinion at that time that the 
spray ball cleaning system installed by Tel Tech was dangerous 
and unsafe because of the absence of any walk protection such 
as adhesive grit strips, which could easily and economically be 
attached to the tanker skin on areas where a user of Tel Tech's 
cleaning system would possibly walk or stand. 
Prior to trial, plaintiff submitted jury instructions 
which outlined plaintiff's theories of recovery, namely that 
Tel Tech was negligent in failing to provide suitable walk 
protection in connection with its design and installation of 
1
 All other defendants in the case were subsequently settled 
out or dismissed. 
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the cleaning system, and that the spray ball cleaning system, 
without walk protection, constituted a defective and dangerous 
product in that it exposed users to a fall hazard. Plaintiff's 
Alternate and Revised Proposed Jury Instructions, R, at 
781-799. (See Plaintiff's Alternate and Revised Proposed Jury 
Instructions attached hereto as Addendum A.) 
Tel Tech's proposed jury instructions submitted prior 
to trial also contained several instructions specifically 
addressing plaintiff's strict liability theory and defenses 
thereto. Defendant's Request for Special Verdict and Jury 
Instructions, R. at 805, Instruction Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15. 
At trial, during Mr. Eilers' testimony, Tel Tech's 
counsel objected to opinions regarding strict liability, 
claiming surprise. Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter 
referred to simply as "Transcript"), R. 922 at 28. After an 
in-chambers hearing on the matter, the trial couct found that 
strict liability had been fairly raised by the facts, issues, 
and the proposed jury instructions, and that Tel Tech had no 
grounds for claiming surprise. I_d. at 32; Transcript, R. 927 
at 28. The court proceeded to allow Mr. Eilers to- provide 
opinions regarding the strict liability theory to the jury. 
Transcript, R. 922 at 32. 
The next day, during an in-chambers conference 
regarding jury instructions, and after the close of the 
evidentiary portion of the trial, the court directed a verdict 
on plaintiff's strict liability theory, concluding it was not a 
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theory supported by the evidence. Transcript, R. 927 at 
23-24. Over plaintiff's objection, the court instructed the 
jury only on plaintiff's negligence theory. Transcript, R. 926 
at 11-31. 
The jury returned with a verdict finding that neither 
defendant nor plaintiff was negligent. Special Verdict, R. 
884-886. The district court entered its final judgment on 
February 8, 1989. Judgment, R. 895-896. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
At trial, plaintiff presented substantial evidence 
demonstrating that Tel Tech was in the business of selling and 
installing dairy equipment in general, including specifically 
spray balls for use on tanker trucks such as the one on which 
plaintiff was injured. Transcript, R. 925 at 133. Tel Tech 
had installed approximately 100 such spray balls in tankers 
during the period between 1978 and 1983. Transcript, R. 924 at 
48-51. Tel Tech had installed a number of these spray balls on 
tankers prior to the time that it sold and installed the spray 
balls at issue in May 1979. 1^ 1. at 53. 
In May 1979, Meadow Gold, plaintiff's employer, 
requested Tel Tech to install a spray ball cleaning system in 
the milk tanker on which plaintiff was subsequently injured. 
Transcript, R. 924 at 21. Meadow Gold did not give Tel Tech 
any instructions as to how to install the spray ball system. 
Id. at 27-28. Tel Tech sold and installed the spray ball 
system and was duly paid by Meadow Gold. _Id. at 22; 
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Transcript, R. 922 at 92. Had Tel Tech installed walk 
protection on the tanker, Meadow Gold would have accepted Tel 
Tech's work. Transcript, R. 923 at 23, 26. 
The tanker truck at issue was an elliptical-shaped 
tube tanker with two interior compartments, with a polished 
stainless steel skin. (See, Plaintiff's Trial Exhs. 2, 4, 5, 
6, photographs of the tanker at issue.) The tanker, in its 
condition at the time of plaintiff's injury, had two ladders on 
each side of the tanker which went from the fenders up to the 
top of the tanker for access to the two domed hatches leading 
to the interior compartments of the tanker. Transcript, R. 925 
at 156-157. Between the domes on the top of the tanker, 
anti-slip grit paper had been fastened down for a secure 
walking surface for persons needing access to the domes. Id. 
Prior to the time Tel Tech installed the spray ball 
system in May 1979, there was no reason for Mr. Conger, in 
connection with his duties as a tanker driver, to step over the 
hatches or walk along the stainless steel skin of the tanker 
top towards the ends of the tanker truck where there was no 
walk protection (Transcript, R. 925 at 160), and he had never 
done so. Id. 
Tel Tech's installation of the spray ball system in 
May 1979 consisted of the drilling of holes in the top of the 
tanker skin towards each end of the tanker and the installation 
of two spray balls in the holes. I_d. at 167. The spray balls 
consisted of pipe inserted vertically through the top of tanker 
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skin into the interior of each compartment onto which a spray 
ball would be attached inside the compartment and a fitting on 
the top for hooking up a hose directly to the spray ball 
connection. Water and detergent would then be sprayed through 
the spray ball for cleaning the. inside of the tank. 
Transcript, R. 924 at 56. 
Tel Tech was well aware that the most common way in 
which users got access to its cleaning systems was to climb up 
a tanker ladder and walk along the top to the spray balls. 
Transcript, R. 922 at 118-119, 123. Tel Tech further knew that 
its installation of the spray ball cleaning system created a 
fall hazard to those who used its system. _ld. at 123. At the 
time Tel Tech sold the cleaning system to Meadow Gold, it knew 
of the existence of grit strips for such tankers, and knew they 
provided a measure of safety from slipping to users of such 
spray ball cleaning systems. Id., at 116. It knew of the 
availability of such material (j^ d. at 117) and easily could 
have installed grit strips. Id., at 117-118. 
Despite its knowledge, Tel Tech did not install any 
kind of walk protection on the top of the tanker to facilitate 
safe access to and use of its cleaning system by persons who 
would approach the spray balls from the middle of the tanker 
where the ladders and previously existing walk protection 
existed. Transcript, R. 925 at 167-168, Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhs. 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
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To use the spray ball cleaning system, Conger and 
other drivers at Meadow Gold would carry a hose from a building 
at Meadow Gold's facility up one of the ladders on the tanker, 
and would step over the domes and walk along the bare stainless 
steel skin to each of the spray balls. Transcript, R. 925 at 
168-169, Due to the nature of the physical facilities where 
Conger usually cleaned out the tanker, he had no other feasible 
way to access the spray ball hookups other than to walk along 
the top of the tanker from the attached ladders in the middle 
of the tanker. Jd. at 170, 229-230. After having walked 
safely on the top of the tanker several hundred times during 
the course of his work over the next year and a half, 
plaintiff, on January 1, 1981, slipped on the smooth stainless 
steel skin as he was walking towards a spray ball and fell off 
the tanker, sustaining serious injuries. Transcript, R. 925 at 
173, 176-180. 
Carl Eilers, plaintiff's liability expert, testified 
at length during trial of his experience and expertise in the 
tanker business and with regard to the design, sale, and 
installation of various types of spray ball cleaning systems. 
Transcript, R. 922 at 4-10. Eilers testified as to several 
different spray ball cleaning systems that were available and 
feasible at the time of Tel Tech's installation of the subject 
spray ball system in 1979, including spray ball systems which 
by their design avoided the necessity of a man getting on top 
of the tanker. Id. at 10-15. With regard to the design of the 
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spray ball cleaning system sold and installed by Tel Tech, 
Eilers testified that the system created a fall hazard, "So you 
have to be careful when you're going to use this, that you 
design out the hazard and make it safe." _Id. at 17. 
Eilers testified that . in his experience, when a 
customer asked for the installation of this type of spray ball 
cleaning system on an existing tanker and gave his company no 
other specifications or details as to how to apply it, his 
company would invariably install walk protection on the tanker 
top in order to furnish a safe product. Analogizing the seller 
and installer of a spray ball system on a tanker to a 
manufacturer, Eilers testified, " . . . we have to look at the 
safety aspects. We're putting something in and we're creating 
a hazard if we don't apply some method of getting that walkway 
out there so the man has something to stand on." Transcript, 
R. 922 at 18. Eilers further stated that the standard of care 
in the spray ball industry required that walk protection be 
installed in connection with every installation of a spray ball 
cleaning system such as chosen by Tel Tech in this case. Id. 
at 24, 27. 
When Mr. Eilers was asked his opinion of whether the 
spray ball system installed by Tel Tech was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous, counsel for Tel Tech objected and an 
off-the-record discussion ensued. Transcript, R. 922 at 28. 
Despite Tel Tech's claim that strict liability had not been 
pleaded formally in the case, the trial court recognized that 
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strict liability in fact had been raised in pretrial discovery 
and in the jury instructions submitted by both parties before 
trial, and that evidence of the defective and dangerous 
character of the spray ball cleaning system should be allowed 
through Mr. Eilers. Transcript, R. 922 at 28-32 (attached 
hereto as Addendum B) . The court proceeded to allow Mr. Eilers 
to continue his testimony with regard to the defective nature 
of Tel Tech's spray ball system, and to express ultimate 
opinions that the spray ball cleaning system installed by Tel 
Tech without walk protection was defectively designed. Id. at 
34-40 (attached hereto as Addendum C) . 
After having laid foundation through Mr. Eilers' 
personal experience and professional expertise on the efficacy 
of grit strips, plaintiff's counsel asked Mr. Eilers whether an 
appropriate grit strip would have provided sufficient traction 
to have prevented Conger's fall; the trial court, however, 
sustained an objection that the question called for 
speculation. Id. at 45. During the defendant's case in chief, 
Tel Tech's counsel asked Dr. Blotter (defendant's expert), "Do 
you have an opinion as to whether or not if you* put on [grit] 
strips, this accident would have been avoided?" The trial court 
allowed Dr. Blotter to answer over plaintiff's objection that 
the court had disallowed plaintiff's expert from answering the 
identical question. Id., at 151-152. The court finally allowed 
Mr. Eilers to answer a similar question in plaintiff's rebuttal 
case; Mr. Eilers testified that had Tel Tech's cleaning system 
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included grit strips along the access area to the spray balls, 
Conger probably would not have fallen. Id. at 207. 
After the close of all evidence in the case, Tel Tech 
moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff's strict liability 
theory, on the grounds that the evidence showed the spray balls 
themselves worked as intended, that Tel Tech was only a 
supplier of services to whom strict liability did not apply, 
and that plaintiff's real complaint was that the installation 
of the spray balls was done negligently.[ An in-chambers 
hearing was held in which the issue was extensively argued and 
cases claimed by Tel Tech to be applicable were reviewed. 
Transcript, R. 927 at 4-15. (The entire transcript of the 
in-chambers proceedings is attached hereto as Addendum D.) 
The trial court concluded that Tel Tech's installation 
of the spray ball system without any walk protection was 
analogous to the supplier of a tire who fails to attach lug 
nuts adequately when the tire is installed on a car. The court 
ruled that strict liability therefore was inapplicable, despite 
admitting that cases applying strict liability to the absence 
of safety devices or features "are pretty close to it; a fine 
line." Id. at 22. 
1
 Tel Tech also based its motion on the claim that the 
court's previous ruling allowing the strict liability claim to 
be considered (essentially conforming the pleadings to the 
issues raised by the parties) somehow contravened the statute 
of limitations. It has long been established in case law and 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, that amendments 
to the claims between litigants which add new theories on the 
same subject matter relate back to the original complaint, and 
do not run afoul of statutes of limitations. Meyers v. 
Interwest Corp. , 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981); Rule 15, Utah R. 
Civ. P. (attached hereto as Addendum E). 
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After having thrown out plaintiff's strict liability 
theory, the court accordingly refused to submit plaintiff's 
strict liability instructions and Conger duly excepted to the 
deletion of those instructions. (Transcript, R. 926 at 10c) 
The court then instructed the jury as follows: 
Before I instruct you, I need to apprise you 
of one legal matter that has been taken care 
of. Originally, the plaintiff was making a 
claim against the defendant on two different 
legal theories; one was a fault theory and 
one was — what's called a product liability 
theory, which is a theory of law upon which 
people can recover from defective products 
that cause injuries regardless of fault. 
I dismissed the second claim for legal 
reasons which the Court doesn't need to 
concern you with. And you will be asked to 
determine this case based on the negligence 
or fault theory. But some of the evidence 
that came into trial related solely to the 
the product theory, evidence that the 
product that was sold was defective and 
unreasonably safe. You'll hear some of the 
discussions between the lawyers, whether 
that evidence should be admitted, because 
that legal theory is no longer part of the 
case. That evidence is not relevant and 
will be stricken from the record, and you 
should treat it as if you've never known it. 
Is that sufficient explanation? 
MR. BERRY: I believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
Id. at 11-12. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tel Tech, 
finding as follows in the special verdict: 
I.A. Was Tel Tech, Inc. negligent? 
ANSWER: No. 
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I.B. Was Robert E. Conger negligent? 
ANSWER: No. 
Special Verdict, R. 890-892; Judgment, R. 895-896. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in 
directing a verdict on plaintiff's strict liability claim. 
1. A party is entitled to present his theory of the 
case when there is any evidence justifying it in the record. 
2. All of the prima facie factual elements of strict 
liability were present in this case — Tel Tech was in the 
business of selling the equipment at issue and sold the spray 
ball cleaning system to plaintiff's employer — a qualified 
expert testified that the cleaning system was defective in 
design due to the lack of a necessary safety feature, i.e., 
walk protection — and this defective and dangerous condition 
caused plaintiff's injury. 
3. The absence of a safety device in connection with 
a product which otherwise functions normally is a proper basis 
for strict liability. 
4. The defective or dangerous nature of Tel Tech's 
spray ball system is not due to an improper or negligent 
installation of the spray balls themselves, but from the hazard 
presented to the user of the product as a result of the absence 
of a necessary safety device or safeguard. 
5. The trial court's directed verdict and subsequent 
instructions to the jury to disregard significant portions of 
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the testimony of Carl Eilers prejudiced plaintiff's ability to 
obtain a fair determination of the negligence issue and 
therefore requires retrial of the defendant's negligence with 
the strict liability issue. 
6. The issue of plaintiff's negligence or fault, 
having been fully determined at trial, and having been 
unaffected by the deletion of plaintiff's strict liability 
theory, is res judicata in any future trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT ON PLAINTIFF'S STRICT LIABILITY THEORY 
A. Standard of Review. 
It is well established in Utah law that, in reviewing 
a motion for directed verdict, the court must examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the verdict is directed, and must resolve every controverted 
fact in favor of the party against whom the directed verdict is 
entered. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 
608, 611 (Utah 1982); Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 
732 (Utah 1984); Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 746 
P.2d 1194, 1196 (Utah App. 1987), cert denied, 771 P.2d 325 
(Utah 1988). 
B. A Party Is Entitled To Present Every Theory of 
His Case Supported by Any Evidence. 
In granting Tel Tech's motion for directed verdict, 
the trial court improperly usurped the jury function of 
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deciding whether or not the spray ball cleaning system sold and 
installed by Tel Tech was defective: 
The spray ball was not defective. The 
product was not defective. Now, once it was 
in, the whole tanker may have been 
defective, but the thing they sold was not 
defective. 
Transcript, R. 927 at 23; see Addendum D. By concluding that 
the spray ball was not defective, the trial court ignored the 
testimony of plaintiff's expert, and simply decided an issue of 
fact based upon the court's own particular point of view. In 
so doing, the trial court acted as an advocate, and violated 
its duty to instruct the jury on each of plaintiff's theories 
supported by evidence. The rule in Utah has long been 
established that it is the duty of the court to cover the 
theories of both parties in the instructions. Startin v. 
Madsen, 237 P.2d 834 (Utah 1951); Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 
878, 880 (Utah 1974); Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977); Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 
458 (Utah 1981); Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 
1977); Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah App. 
1987). Failure to give requested instructions is reversible 
error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the 
jury on the law. Steele v. Breinholt; Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 
P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1988). Here the court's direction 
of a verdict and refusal to instruct the jury on plaintiff's 
strict liability claim clearly prejudiced Conger and 
insufficiently advised the jury on applicable law of the case. 
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Evidence at trial on plaintiff's strict liability 
claim easily justified its submission to the jury as a separate 
theory from plaintiff's negligence claim. In Utah, to make out 
a claim for strict liability, a plaintiff must present evidence 
that (1) the defendant sold a defective or unreasonably 
dangerous product, (2) the defendant was in the business of 
selling the product at issue, (3) the product reached the 
consumer without any substantial change in its condition, and 
(4) the dangerous condition or defect of the product caused the 
injury to the user. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 
601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). All of these elements were 
presented through competent evidence to the jury during trial. 
Tel Tech's sale of the spray ball cleaning system was 
established through Don Dvorak's deposition testimony 
(Transcript, R. 924 at 22) as well as Randy Telford, Tel Tech's 
former president (Transcript, R. 922 at 92). Dan Toone and 
Leonard Telford, ex-employees of Tel Tech, established that Tel 
Tech was in the business of selling dairy equipment, including 
specifically such spray balls to tankers and dairies 
(Transcript, R. 925 at 133), and that TeL Tech had installed 
approximately 100 such spray balls in tankers (Transcript, R. 
924 at 48-51). Conger's testimony established that the 
dangerous condition of the spray ball system continued 
unchanged until he was injured. Transcript, R. 925 at 161-164, 
228-232. Carl Eilers established through his expert testimony 
that the design of the spray ball cleaning system was 
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unreasonably dangerous and defective and that this condition 
caused plaintiff's accident. Transcript, R. 922 at 28-40, 207. 
Having established a prima facie case of strict 
liability based on a defective and dangerous design of the 
spray ball cleaning system, plaintiff clearly should have been 
allowed to present that theory to the jury. 
C. The Absence of a Safety Device in Connection with 
a Product Otherwise Fit for Its Intended Function 
Is the Proper Basis for the Application of Strict 
Liability. 
The trial court's directed verdict on the issue of 
strict liability was in large part a result of its erroneous 
perception that "the spray ball was not defective" because the 
cleaning system functioned in the manner that it was intended 
by the seller, Tel Tech. Transcript, R. 927 at 23. The court 
further confused the nature of plaintiff's separate theories, 
in that it erroneously perceived that plaintiff's strict 
liability claim was essentially equal to a claim that the spray 
ball system was installed in a negligent or defective manner. 
Id. at 17-18. The court primarily relied on a case cited 
within another case given to the court by counsel for Tel Tech 
during his argument in chambers on his motion for directed 
verdict. The case provided by Tel Tech's counsel was Davis v. 
Pacific Diesel Power Co., 598 P.2d 1228 (Ore. App. 1979), but 
the case which persuaded the trial court to grant the motion 
for directed verdict, cited in the Davis opinion, was Hoover v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 528 P.2d 76 (Ore. 1974). 
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Hoover involved plaintiff's purchase of a new tire 
from a retail store. The defendant's employees placed the new 
tire on the spare wheel and mounted the wheel on plaintiff's 
car. Several weeks later the plaintiff was involved in a 
one-car accident, and plaintiff sued the retail tire dealer. 
Significantly, Hoover never alleged that there was any design 
defect with the tire in any respect; rather, plaintiff alleged 
solely that defendant had failed to tighten the lug nuts on the 
wheel bolts and had failed to inspect the wheel to see that it 
was properly attached. Furthermore, Hoover alleged that the 
automobile was the unreasonably dangerous product by virtue of 
an improper installation of the tire and wheel by the 
defendant. The Oregon court, noting that Hoover did not 
contend the product (the tire) sold was defective, correctly 
categorized the case as presenting an issue of whether the 
definition of a dangerously defective product "should be 
expanded within strict liability to include the negligent 
installation of a nondefective product." Hoover, 528 P.2d at 
77. The court was not willing to stretch the doctrine of 
strict liability to such an extreme and found no other cases 
having done so. 
The trial court's reliance on Hoover is clearly 
misplaced. Contrary to Hoover, Conger's claim is that the 
product sold and installed by Tel Tech, the spray ball cleaning 
system, was defective and dangerous because its operation 
subjected users to a fall hazard and the product failed to 
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provide a safeguard against this hazard encountered in using 
the product. No such design defect in the tire sold by the 
defendant existed in Hoover; plaintiff's only claim there was 
simply that the defendant did not properly install the tire 
using the existing design — the defendant failed to secure lug 
nuts. 
Here the essence of Conger's strict liability claim is 
not that the application of the spray balls was somehow 
improper; rather, the essence of plaintiff's claim is that the 
cleaning system sold by Tel Tech lacked a feature which was 
essential to safe operation of the cleaning system. 
Such an analysis under strict liability is not new or 
novel. Courts have routinely recognized that a product may be 
defective or dangerous for strict liability purposes where the 
product fails to incorporate a safeguard or safety device to 
minimize or eliminate a risk of injury to users, even though 
the product functions exactly as it is intended in the absence 
of the safeguard. The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
applying Utah law in diversity, have recognized this very 
theory in Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 
1983). Beacham affirmed the judgment in favor of plaintiff, 
holding defendants strictly liable, where the defect was the 
lack of a guard to shield a pinch point on a roof bolter used 
in mining applications. There was no dispute the roof bolter 
functioned as it was intended to by the seller and designer. 
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The Tenth Circuit stated: "In this case, Beacham argued that 
the roof bolter was unreasonably dangerous by reason of a 
defect in design: the lack of a guard shielding the pinch 
point." I_d. at 1014. Neither the district court: nor the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had any difficulty acknowledging 
plaintiff's right to submit such a strict liability theory to 
the jury; in fact, this was not even a point of complaint by 
defendant on appeal. 
Just as with the cleaning system installed by Tel 
Tech, the Lee-Norse roof bolter operated precisely as it was 
intended by the seller; the plaintiff made no claim that it did 
not. The concept of strict liability, however, provides a 
remedy where such products nevertheless create an unreasonably 
dangerous hazard to those persons who operate or use such 
products. Cases are legion upholding this concept of strict 
liability under various factual circumstances. See, e.g., 
Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711 (Mont. 1978) (strict 
liability sustained based on evidence of design defect on 
self-unloading feed wagon in failing to provide steps or other 
access for safely mounting the equipment); Bailey v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co., Inc., 690 P.2d 1280, 1281-82 (Colo. App. 1984) 
(defendant strictly liable to plaintiffs as a result of defects 
in tire sold and installed by defendant by reason of 
defendant's failure adequately to warn plaintiffs of dangers 
associated with installing used tubes in new tires — "Thus, 
defendant's argument that strict liability cannot be maintained 
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if the product itself is not defective misses the point that 
failure to warn through adequate directions or instructions may 
itself constitute a product defect"); Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. 
Co. , 700 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1984) (defective design and 
unreasonably dangerous condition of garbage truck was the 
inadequacy of space on running board available for worker to 
perform usual duties); Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 417 N.E.2d 154 
(111. App. 1981) (lack of safe maintenance access to overhead 
crane can be a defect for strict liability in tort); Hornbeck 
v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 572 P.2d 620 (Ore. 
1977) (jury could find that defendant was strictly liable to 
fireman injured in fall from fire truck, based on proof of an 
unreasonably dangerous design of the truck because horizontal 
bar furnished as hand hold for firemen riding footboard was 
placed too low; the fact that jury found the defendant was not 
negligent in its design and construction of hand hold bar did 
not preclude it from finding that the bar was unreasonably 
dangerous in its design); Allen v. Heil Co. , 589 P.2d 1120 
(Ore. 1979) (manufacturer of wood fiber dryer used in 
fiberboard mill could be found strictly liable by reason of 
design defect where the machine required persons making 
inspection of its internal operations to be exposed to risk of 
injury from fire and flames; directed verdict for manufacturer 
reversed); Atkins v. Blaw Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, Inc., 
483 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (a steel bar straightening 
machine without a feed-in table for containment of the bar was 
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defective in its design, because such a feed-in table was 
necessary for safe operation of the machine by the operator); 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App. 
1980) (jury could find design defect resulting from plaintiff's 
claim that the step on a Caterpillar tractor from which he fell 
was defectively designed, despite lack of evidence justifying 
any finding that the step was negligently designed); Little v. 
PPG Industries, Inc., 594 P.2d 911, 913, 916 (Wash. 1979) 
(plaintiff allowed to seek recovery upon strict liability 
theory based upon absence of adequate warnings, where jury 
could have found that, despite lack of proof of negligence by 
defendant, the warning placed on the product containers was 
inadequate to apprise user of dangers); Arthur v. Avon 
Inflatables, Ltd. , 203 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4, 5 (Cal. App. 1984) 
(defendant's judgment notwithstanding verdict reversed by 
appellate court on grounds that life rafts supplied by 
defendant could be found defective and dangerous due to the 
lack of appropriate emergency equipment such as a portable 
emergency radio transmitter and adequate water supplies and 
first-aid kits, even though life . raft itself operated as 
intended by the seller); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 
575 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (loader which was not equipped with 
seat belts or roll bar, but which otherwise operated exactly as 
intended by the seller, could be found to be defective in its 
design under strict liability principles); Pike v. Frank G. 
Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970) (bulldozer without rearview 
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mirrors was subject to strict liability for design defect); 
Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1972) (power lawn mower 
with unguarded hole could properly be found defective in spite 
of the fact that defect was patent and hence probably within 
the reasonable contemplation .of the ordinary consumer); Ontai 
v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Hawaii 1983) 
(seller of x-ray table could be strictly liable based on design 
defect for failure to equip x-ray table with safety device that 
would prevent footrest from collapsing while table was in 
vertical position — directed verdict against plaintiff 
reversed); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 
(Alaska 1979) (absence of rollover protective shield on 
Caterpillar tractor justified submission to jury that the 
product, however perfectly manufactured, may be defectively 
designed or unreasonably dangerous by its failure to 
incorporate safety features); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 
A.2d 281, 285 (N.J. 1972) (lack of safety device on a punch 
press held to render product unreasonably dangerous to user --
"The public interest in assuring that safety devices are 
installed demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him 
to leave such a critical phase of his manufacturing process to 
the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser").1 
Additional examples: Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (automobile design could be found to 
be defective due to its failure to be reasonably crashworthy, 
despite fact that design or construction vehicle did not cause 
accident itself); Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574 
(11th Cir. 1986) (applying Alabama law, jury could determine 
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It is also well established that where instructions to 
the jury are submitted on both defective design and negligence 
theories, a finding of no negligence does not preclude a 
finding of strict liability for inadequate or defective 
defective design in a chain saw furnished without a chain 
guard); Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 739 P.2d 1177 
(Wash, App. 1987) (lower court erred in granting summary 
judgment to defendant on issues of design defect and 
negligence, where press sold by defendant without adequate hand 
guarding devices; moreover, manufacturer could not delegate to 
the buyer its responsibility to provide an otherwise dangerous 
product with appropriate safety devices); Lanclos v. Rockwell 
Intern. Corp. , 470 So.2d 924 (La. App. 1985) (wood shaper was 
defective because shaper blades were not guarded); Siebern v. 
Missouri-Illinois Tractor & Equipment Co., 711 S.W.2d 935 (Mo. 
App. 1986) (judgment for defendant reversed based on erroneous 
exclusion of expert testimony that coal loader without rollover 
protective shield was defective); Eldridge v. Firestone Tire St 
Rubber Co. , 493 N.E.2d 293 (Ohio App. 1985) (whether or not 
defendant's lawn mower was defective due to its lack of guards 
was question for the jury even though no other lawn mower 
manufacturer provided such guard at that time -- directed 
verdict for defendant reversed); Gann v. International 
Harvester Co. of Canada, Ltd., 712 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1986) 
(evidence was sufficient for jury to find that tractor without 
rollover protective shield was defective); Parkins v. Van Doren 
Sales, Inc. , 724 P.2d 389 (Wash. App. 1986) (issue of fact 
existed with regard to design defects of conveyor parts 
manufactured and sold without safety guards; manufacturer was 
not entitled to rely upon purchaser to install guards and 
provide warnings); Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 
S.W.2d 828 (Mo. App. 1984) (location of inspection door on 
conveyor such that maintenance man could not see shear pins 
without exposing himself to hazard justified strict liability 
finding based on defective design); General Elec. Co. v. 
Schmal, 623 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App. 1981) (electronic control 
system as applied to a piercing press was defectively 
designed); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law, evidence was sufficient for 
jury to conclude that absence of backup alarm on the skidder 
caused plaintiff's injuries); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Boyett, 674 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App. 1984) (where operator of 
front-end loader experienced total brake, steering, and 
transmission failure causing him to lose control of vehicle, 
jury easily could have determined from evidence that lack of 
emergency braking system was a design defect which proximately 
caused accident). 
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design. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward 8c Co., 690 P.2d at 1281; 
Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 594 P.2d at 916; Hornbeck v. 
Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 572 P„2d at 623; 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 599 S.W.2d at 637-638. 
The above cases clearly demonstrate the error of the 
trial court in removing from the jury's consideration a well 
recognized theory of liability which was amply supported by 
testimony and evidence in the record. The court's conclusion 
that the strict liability theory was inappropriate because it 
believed "the spray balls were not defective" or because it 
believed their installation may have rendered only the tanker 
itself defective, is simply judicial advocacy of an ultimate 
factual issue or a misapprehension of plaintiff's two theories. 
If the court's erroneous analysis were extended to its 
logical extreme, it could also have concluded as a matter of 
law that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury instruction on 
his negligence theory, since one could likewise characterize 
Tel Tech's installation of the spray balls themselves as not 
negligent -- they indisputably worked exactly as Tel Tech 
intended them to work. This extension of the court's reasoning 
reveals the defect therein: Plaintiff, in both his negligence 
theory and strict liability theory, has never claimed that the 
actual technique of installing the spray balls themselves was 
done negligently or improperly. Rather, plaintiff's theories 
have always been that (1) Tel Tech created a hazard to users of 
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the system in designing and installing its cleaning system, and 
failed to act reasonably to reduce or eliminate that hazard 
(negligence), and (2) Tel Tech's cleaning system, which lacked 
any type of safeguard to allow users to approach and use it 
safely, constituted a product which was unreasonably dangerous 
or defective in its design (strict liability). The trial court 
erred by refusing to acknowledge plaintiff's right to jury 
instructions under these legally distinct but factually related 
theories• 
Tel Tech has attempted to categorize plaintiff's 
defective design theory as an improper effort to impose strict 
liability on the seller of a service, as opposed to a product. 
This position simply ignores the undisputed evidence in this 
case that Tel Tech sold the spray ball cleaning system to 
Meadow Gold. Transcript, R. 924 at 22; Transcript, R. 922 at 
92. It also ignores the undisputed evidence that Tel Tech 
clearly was in the business of selling equipment to dairies and 
for use on dairy tankers such as the one at issue. Transcript, 
R. 925 at 133; Transcript, R. 924 at 48-51. Thus, Tel Tech's 
authorities with regard to the refusal to extend strict 
liability to purely service providers such as hospitals or 
architects are completely inopposite. The law in fact is well 
established that strict liability is appropriate even where the 
defendant supplies both products and services, where the 
product is alleged to have been defective in some way. See, 
e.g. , Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969) 
(beauty shop held strictly liable when defective permanent wave 
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lotion applied to patron's hair); Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 
573 (Nev. 1971) (redecorator of house supplied defective gas 
pipe fittings); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 481 P.2d 924 
(Wash. App. 1971) (beauty shop supplied defective permanent 
wave lotion). 
It is also clear that component sellers or suppliers 
are uniformly subject to the strict liability doctrine where 
causal connection exists between a defect in or a dangerous 
condition arising out of the component and the injury. See, 
e.g., Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 522 A.2d 
52 (Pa. Super. 1987); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276 
(Colo. 1978); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 347 
(111. App. 1966); Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 
(8th Cir. 1974). 
Finally, strict liability has also been applied to 
installers of defective mechanical devices, where the evidence 
showed the installation caused the product defect. Brannon v. 
Southern Illinois Hospital Corp., 386 N.E.2d 1126 (111. App. 
1978) (installer found strictly liable for installing a 
dumbwaiter in an unreasonably dangerous condition); Woodrick v.' 
Smith Gas Service, Inc., 230 N.E.2d 508 (111. App. 1967) 
(defendant installed an "auto-start" device, causing 
plaintiff's car to unintentionally accelerate). 
On the other hand, in Abel v. General Motors Corp., 
507 N.E.2d 1369 (111. App. 1987), a case cited and relied upon 
by Tel Tech in its motion for directed verdict, the plaintiff 
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had not alleged that the defendant, who had given plaintiff's 
car a tuneup, had installed any particular defective product 
which caused plaintiff's car to lurch and lunge inexplicably. 
The court noted in Abel that the most plaintiff could establish 
was that plaintiff's car began to lurch and lunge for the first 
time after the defendant had provided the tuneup service. The 
court's denial of plaintiff's strict liability theory in Abel, 
therefore, rested in large part on a failure of proof by the 
plaintiff to show the cause of the defective handling of 
plaintiff's automobile, and particularly that the installation 
of any parts by the defendant had any causal connection to the 
problems. No such causal difficulties between the product 
installed by the defendant and the plaintiff's injury exist 
here. 
Conger, because of the court's errors outlined above, 
must be granted a new trial on his strict liability theory. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMONITION TO THE JURY 
TO IGNORE SUBSTANTIAL AND KEY ASPECTS 
OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE REQUIRES RETRIAL 
OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE THEORY 
The legal theories of a strict liability claim for 
defective design of a product, and a claim of negligent design 
of the same product, are, as outlined above, obviously 
separate. Strict liability theory focuses, of course, on the 
defective or dangerous nature of the product itself, whereas 
the negligence theory focuses on the propriety of the conduct 
of the defendant. As outlined above, plaintiff has a right to 
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proceed to trial on both theories, and may prevail on a strict 
liability without prevailing on the negligence, or vice versa, 
because of the separate elements of proof with respect to each 
theory. Nevertheless, the theories obviously are interrelated 
factually. 
Because of the factual interrelatedness of plaintiff's 
two theories here, the trial court's instruction to the jury to 
ignore any evidence and testimony relating to plaintiff's claim 
of a defective or dangerous product (Transcript, R. 926 at 11) 
surely created significant confusion and misunderstanding in 
the minds of the jury. This is particularly true in light of 
the fact that the bulk of plaintiff's evidence with regard to 
negligence and the defective and dangerous nature of the spray 
ball system came through the testimony of plaintiff's expert, 
Carl Eilers. 
The court's instructions to the jury to disregard 
"some of the evidence" or "that evidence" (id.) was hopelessly 
vague and general. Indeed, it would have been difficult if not 
impossible for the court to have meaningfully separated the 
evidence the jury should disregard from that evidence it should 
not. In such a circumstance, since the court cannot tell what 
evidence of defendant's negligence the jury may have 
disregarded, this Court should order a new trial on plaintiff's 
negligence theory as well. Mikkelson v. Haslam, 764 P.2d at 
1389; Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 606-607 (Utah 1983); 
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Intermountain Farmers Association v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 
1164 (Utah 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 860 (Utah 1972). 
III. 
THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE HAS BEEN DECIDED, 
HAS NOT BEEN TAINTED BY THE ERRONEOUS RULING 
OF THE COURT AND, THEREFORE, IS RES JUDICATA 
While both plaintiff's substantive theories of 
recovery against Tel Tech were prejudiced and undermined by the 
trial court's rulings and instructions described above, no such 
adverse effect accrued to Tel Tech's claims that plaintiff was 
negligent in his conduct. No limitations whatsoever on the 
issue of plaintiff's negligence were imposed by the trial court 
as a result of its dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability 
claim. Instruction Nos. 19, 20, and 21 of the instructions 
given to the jury completely set out all affirmative defenses 
which Tel Tech requested with respect to plaintiff's conduct, 
even if plaintiff's strict liability theory had been 
submitted. Instructions to the Jury, R. 847-883. 
Utah has clearly limited the appropriate defenses to a 
strict liability claim to two: (1) plaintiff's voluntary and 
unreasonable use of the product in the face of danger known to 
the plaintiff, and (2) misuse of the product by the user or 
consumer. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d at 
158; Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302-3, 
(Utah 1981). The defenses of misuse and assumption of risk 
must relate to the defective product and cannot be extended to 
cover conduct of the user unrelated to the product. Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d at 158. 
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Here, Tel Tech's claim that plaintiff voluntarily 
assumed a known risk was clearly presented to the jury, and the 
jury answered the special verdict that plaintiff was guilty of 
no negligence in this regard. No separate misuse defense was 
ever alleged by Tel Tech. Therefore, since all of Tel Tech's 
proposed jury instructions on plaintiff's conduct were covered 
by the court's instructions, and plaintiff's comparative 
negligence has been fully and fairly resolved, this issue 
should be foreclosed on retrial, based on the principle of res 
judicata. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d at 606-607; cf. , 
Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d at 1389. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff 
respectfully requests this court to remand for trial on 
plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of August, 1989. 
GIAUQUE^^IljflrAMS, WILCOX Sc 
BENDi 
ff/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E 
vs. 
TEL TECH, 
. CONGER, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
INC., ) 
Defendant. ) 
PLAINTIFF'S ALTERNATE AND 
REVISED PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Civil No- C82-7444 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
Plaintiff, through counsel, submits the following jury 
instructions, Nos. 8 through 19. These instructions replace 
the prior instructions, Nos. 8 through 15, and are made in part 
to clarify the distinction between plaintiff's strict liability 
and negligence claims, in response to defendant's proposed 
instruction Nos. 12 through 15, which confuse the elements of 
these theories. 
The instructions numbered 9, 13, 14, and 15 are 
submitted in the event the court determines that an issue of 
plaintiff's "unreasonable use" of the spray balls exists which 
should be submitted to the jury. 
Finally, instruction No. 18 herein should replace 
plaintiffs original proposed No. 14; the original instruction 
incorrectly stated plaintiffs age and life expectancy. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 20th day of January, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S 
ALTERNATE AND REVISED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS and alternate 
SPECIAL VERDICT form were hand-delivered to the following: 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ten Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant Tel Tech, Inc 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff's case against Tel Tech, Inc., is based 
upon two alternative theories or principles of law. These 
theories of Tel Tech's liability are (2) that Tel Tech was 
negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care in designing, 
installing, or warning with regard to the spray balls, and (2) 
that the spray balls sold and installed by Tel Tech without 
walk protection constituted a defective product for which the 
defendant should be strictly liable. Tel Tech is liable to the 
plaintiff if you find that the plaintiff has proved the 
elements of either of these theories by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant, Tel Tech, owed a duty of reasonable 
care to the plaintiff to install the spray balls in a 
reasonably safe manner, and to avoid creating a hazardous or 
dangerous condition. If you find that defendant Tel Tech 
failed to exercise reasonable care as a proximate result of 
which plaintiff was injured, you must then determine whether 
the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety in a manner which proximately caused his injuries. Your 
findings should then be entered into the appropriate blanks 
contained in the special verdict form which is provided to you. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
For plaintiff to prevail on his strict liability 
theories against the defendant, he must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the spray ball system was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous when it left the control 
of Tel Tech and that the defect or defects proximately caused 
his injuries. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
With respect to plaintiffs theory of strict liability 
against the defendant, you are instructed that when an entity 
designs, manufactures, sells, markets, or otherwise distributes 
any product in a defective condition which is unreasonably 
dangerous to a potential user of that product, such entity is 
strictly liable for all damages suffered by the user which 
result from such a condition, provided that the product was 
expected to and did reach the user without substantial change 
in its condition. 
A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when 
it is not reasonably fit or safe for the ordinary purposes for 
which such products reasonably may be expected to be used. 
Such a product must have created a risk of harm to persons 
which an ordinary user reasonably would not expect or created a 
greater risk of harm than such user would reasonably expect. 
A defect may arise out of the design, manufacture, 
installation, or assembly occurring while the product was in 
the control of the defendant. A product may also be defective 
if not accompanied by adequate warnings of dangers or risks 
from its use, even though the product was made exactly as 
intended. 
Here, plaintiff alleges the spray ball system sold and 
installed by Tel Tech was defective and unreasonably dangerous 
in its design, installation, or from a lack of warning, in that 
the spray ball system lacked walk protection or other features 
to allow the system to be operated safely by foreseeable users. 
"Strict liability- is not the equivalent of making a 
manufacturer or seller of a product absolutely liable as an 
insurer of the product and its use. However, strict liability 
means that if you find the spray ball system installed by Tel 
Tech to be defective and unreasonably dangerous, you must find 
for the plaintiff and against the defendant, even though the 
defendant may have exercised all possible care with regard to 
that product or other similar products. 
INSTRUCTION NO, \}_ 
The defendant has alleged as an affirmative defense to 
plaintiff's negligence claim that plaintiff was negligent in 
failing to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. You 
are instructed that the burden of proof rests upon the 
defendant to establish this allegation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. If upon viewing all of the evidence you do not 
find that this affirmative defense raised by the defendant has 
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall not 
apply that defense to prevent or reduce recovery by plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. » 
The defendant claims that the plaintiff was negligent 
in causing his injury by unreasonably exposing himself to a 
known danger that proximately caused his injury. You are 
instructed that plaintiff did not negligently expose himself to 
a risk of injury unless he unreasonably and voluntarily exposed 
himself to a danger he knew of or should have known of, and 
that danger proximately caused his injuries. If plaintiff was 
required to expose himself to the danger as part of the 
performance of his employment duties, such exposure was not 
voluntary. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 1 
Only the fault of the parties to this action, if any, 
is to be considered by you. You are not to determine whether 
or not any other persons or entities were at fault, nor what 
effect such fault, if any, would have on the parties in this 
action. That is, in determining the existence and relative 
proportions of fault which operated to cause injury in this 
matter, if any, you should consider only the conduct of the 
defendant and of the plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
With regard only to plaintiffs claim of negligence 
against Tel Tech, if you find the plaintiff to have been 
negligent in a way which was a proximate cause of his injuries 
and also that his negligence was equal to or greater than the 
negligence, if any, of the defendant which proximately caused 
plaintiff's injuries/ such a finding would bar plaintiff from 
recovering any damages. In other words, if you should find 
that the negligence of the plaintiff to a degree of 50 percent 
or more proximately caused his injuries, the legal effect would 
be that plaintiff would take nothing in this case. 
If the negligence of plaintiff (if any) is not as 
great as the negligence of the defendant (if any), then the 
damages allowed to plaintiff will be diminished by the court in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributed by you to the 
plaintiff, and plaintiff would be entitled to recover the 
diminished amount. 
You, however, should not diminish the damages on the 
Special Verdict Form. If that is to be done, that is a 
function for the court to carry out. You should determine a 
total damage figure and not change that sum to reflect your 
findings on negligence allocation, whatever such findings may 
be. 
This instruction does not apply to plaintiff's claims 
of strict liability. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Plaintiff has received worker's compensation benefits 
from his employer, Beatrice Foods Company, as required by law. 
Because the employer has provided these benefits, the law 
provides that the employer cannot be sued, and the fault, if 
any, of the employer in contributing to plaintiff's injury may 
not be considered by you in this case. 
If you find for the plaintiff and award damages, you 
are instructed that the plaintiff will be required to repay the 
value of those benefits provided by Beatrice Foods Company from 
the amount of damages awarded by you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you should find that the plaintiff is entitled to a 
verdict, in arriving at the amount of the award, you should 
include: 
1. Special damages for the reasonable value of 
examinations, attention, care, and treatment by physicians, 
surgeons, and others shown by the evidence in the case to have 
been reasonably required and actually given in the treatment of 
the plaintiff; 
2. Special damages for the cost incurred by 
plaintiff for any hospital accommodations and care, services of 
nurses or attendants, ambulance service, x-rays, medicine, and 
other supplies shown reasonably required and actually used in 
the treatment and care of plaintiff; 
3. Special damages for the amount of income and 
other economic benefits lost by plaintiff up to the time of 
trial; 
4. General damages for the reasonable and necessary 
expenses for medical or surgical care, hospitalization, 
nursing, attendants, medicine, and other services, care, or 
supplies which you find from the evidence in the case are 
reasonably certain to be required in the future treatment of 
the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injury in question; 
5. General damages for the amount of income and 
other economic benefits which you find plaintiff will probably 
lose in the future as a proximate result of the injury in 
question; 
6. General damages for the amount which will 
reasonably compensate him for pain, suffering, disabilities, 
mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, loss of quality and 
enjoyment of life, and interference with his marital 
relationship already suffered by him and proximately resulting 
from the injury; 
7. General damages for the amount which will 
reasonably compensate him for any pain, suffering, 
disabilities, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, loss 
of quality and enjoyment of life, and interference with his 
marital relationship which you find that he probably will 
suffer in the future from the same cause; and 
8c The value of any other damage or loss suffered by 
him or probably to be suffered by him as a proximate result of 
the injury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
According to the life expectancy tables compiled by 
the United States Department of Health (published 1983), which 
is a standard table of mortality, the court has judicially 
noticed and received into evidence in this case the fact that 
the life expectancy in this country of a white male person 60 
years of age, as is plaintiff Robert Conger at the present 
time, is an additional 18.4 years. 
This fact is to be considered by you in arriving at 
the amount of damages. Life expectancy, as shown by a 
mortality table, is merely an estimate of the probable average 
remaining length of life of all persons in the United States of 
a given age and sex, and that estimate is based upon a limited 
record of experience. So, the inference which may reasonably 
be drawn from the life expectancy shown by the table applies 
only to one who has the average health and exposure to danger 
of people of that age and sex. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case you will return a special verdict, 
consisting of a series of questions which you must answer. 
There are individual questions about the fault or lack of fault 
of each of the parties and about the amount of damages. In 
answering each question, you must be persuaded, considering all 
of the evidence in the case, that your choice of answers is 
more probably true than not true. It requires the agreement of 
three-fourths, or six, of the jurors to answer each question. 
The same six need not agree on each question. 
When you retire to deliberate, one of your members 
will be selected as foreman, who will preside over your 
deliberations and at the conclusion of your deliberations will 
sign your special verdict form. 
When you arrive at a verdict, you should notify the 
bailiff that you are ready to report to the court. 
DATED this day of January, 1989. 
Judge 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. CONGER, ) 
Plaintiff, ) SPECIAL VERDICT 
vs. ) 
TEL TECH, INC., ) Civil No. C82-7444 
) Honorable Scott Daniels 
Defendant. ) 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in 
the special verdict as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: In the circumstances as shown by the 
evidence, was defendant Tel Tech, Inc. negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 2: If you find that defendant Tel Tech, 
Inc. was negligent, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
plaintiffs injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 3: In the circumstances as shown by the 
evidence, is the defendant, Tel Tech, Inc., strictly liable to 
plaintiff by reason of a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 4: If you have answered Question No. 3 
wyes,,f was the defective product a proximate cause of Robert 
Conger's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you have answered all of the above questions "no," 
you will not answer the remaining questions, but will simply 
sign the verdict. Otherwise, you should continue. 
QUESTION NO. 5: In the circumstances as shown by the 
evidence, was plaintiff Robert Conger negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 6: If you find that plaintiff Robert 
Conger was negligent, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
his own injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 7: Considering the total fault of the 
parties that proximately caused the plaintiff's injury as 100%, 
what percentage is attributed to: 
Defendant Tel Tech, Inc. % 
Plaintiff Robert Conger % 
TOTAL 100% 
The total of the above percentages must add up to 
100%, neither more nor less. It is for you to determine what 
percentage is attributable to each party. 
4199w 
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QUESTION NO. 8: What is the total amount of damages 
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the plaintiff's 
injury? 
1. Special damages $ 
2. General damages $ 
You should include in your answer the monetary amount 
of all damages which you find from the evidence was sustained 
by the plaintiff. 
This verdict form must be signed by your jury foreman. 
Date: 
JURY FOREMAN 
-3-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Robert E. Conger 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Tel Tech, Inc. 
Defendant. 
* * * * * 
CASE NO. 82-7444 
* * * * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
JANUARY 25, 1989 
Q Do you have an opinion, Mr, Eilers, as to whether 
their spray ball system installed by Tel Tech in the manner 
that it was, was a defective and unreasonably safe product? 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object. That's not an 
issue in this case. 
MR. KING: Well, it certainly is. Experts have 
talked about it. 
THE COURT: It's not at issue. 
MR. BERRY: It's not a strict liability case. 
THE COURT: This may take a minute. It's about 
time for a recess anyway. I think we'll excuse the jury and 
discuss this while the jury is in recess. 
While you're out, it's not your duty to converse with or 
permit yourselves to be addressed by any other person or 
subject connected with this trial, and it is your duty not to 
form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to you. We'll be in recess for a few minutes. 
(A recess was taken. Further 
discussion about strict 
liability was held in Court 
out of the presence of the 
jury.) 
THE COURT: This is an issue which Mr. King 
submitted to opposing counsel regarding strict liability. 
MR. BERRY: He hasn't plead it at all, your Honor. 
28 
MR. KING: Your Honor, what was plead was plead 
many years ago. And the pleadings and the arguments and the 
discoveries since Mr. Berry's clients got back into their 
case after the appeal, has all been based on strict 
liabilities as well as negligence. And Mr. Berry himself has 
asked, knew that, because he took Carl Eilers' deposition 
last year and Carl talked about a defective and dangerous 
product. 
I And Mr. Berry has submitted jury instructions himself 
that talk about a defect and dangerous product, and you — 
you've seen those instructions. And I submitted my 
instructions to see those are clarified, and I'm entitled to 
have two theories, both clearly relevant. He talked about a 
dangerous product all through this lawsuit so far, and the 
pleadings don't control it at this point. We have a merger 
of the facts into what we have now and it's relevant. 
THE COURT: Mr. Berry. 
! MR. BERRY: That's not true. He plead negligence 
only and plead that they were negligent in failing to put on 
protective or failing to give a warning, and that's all that 
he's plead in the complaint. I've inquired along the way and 
try to amend and I wanted to go back and be prepared. But I 
didn't get prepared for strict liability claim which he never 
plead. And this is certainly a very adverse basis to bring 
it in at this time during trial. I don't have any time to go 
29 
out and get more witnesses to meet this. 
THE COURT: Why don't you amend your complaint, Mr. 
King, so that will be clear. 
amended 
sorry, 
strict 
I say, 
MR. KING: I never amended it. It was Brent who 
it a year ago. I don't know what it was. Well, I'm 
I'll tell you. I got — and it's true, there's not a 
liability pleading claimed in the complaint, but like 
that was prior to Tel Tech even being dismissed from 
this case several years ago. 
issue, 
THE COURT: Certainly is a legitimate and relevant 
but— 
MR. KING: A second amended complaint was served on 
Mr. Berry, April 9, 1984. 
last ye 
talking 
terms. 
We didn 
MR BERRY: I got out on that, and then I get back 
ar— 
MR. KING: I find it really incredible that he's 
about this after Carl Eilers talked about it in those 
We talked about it with Dr. Blotter in those terms. 
't use strict liability because you don't do that with 
witnesses. We talked about a dangerous product, a hazardous 
product 
and he 
And I submitted jury instructions regarding that, 
submitted jury instructions, your Honor, that use 
those very words, "dangerous product." I can quote him. 
I can't see how he can say this is the first time he 
ever considered that and he submits the instructions. I 
m 1 
refer you to the specific instructions submitted by Mr. 
Berry. Number 14: 
A product is defective and dangerous 
when it has a propensity for causing physical 1 
to the user 
harm beyond 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary user or consumer 
! with the ordinary knowledge common to a foreseeable class of 
user as to it's characteristics. A product is 
or dangerous merely because it is possible to 
using it. 
That's right out of 402A. 
MR. BERRY: That certainly is. But 
do that, I want to be prepared to meet it, but 
it's time to bring it up now. 
THE COURT: It would be a lot easier 
to amend your complaint six months ago or some 
concerned about the unfairness of surprise in 
not defective 
be injured by 
if you try to 
I don't think 
if you moved 
thing. I'm 
changing 
theories at trial, but I think under the circumstances, it's 
— if it's a clear enough situation that there 
indication that this kind of a theory would be 
I'm going to allow the pleading to be amended 
the evidence. 
MR. BERRY: At this time I would lik 
mis-trial. I think your intention is off base 
us by surprise, and I don't think you can give 
has been 
pressed, then 
to conform with 
e to move for a 
and catching 
anybody a fair 
trial when you insert an issue into the case at this time and 
31 
stage of the game. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm concerned about it too, but I 
think under the circumstances it would be a greater problem 
to keep it out than it is to let it in. Your motion is 
denied. 
MR. KING: Your Honor, just for the record, I would 
like to point out Mr. Berry's instructions, Number 12 and 13, 
as well as 14, which I quoted on the record. All go exactly 
to strict liability. They are standard instructions out of a 
handbook on 402A. How can he stand here and say I didn't 
know anything about it. It's incredible. This is not an 
issue of me changing the ball game in the middle of trial. 
MR. BERRY: You told us all along you're proceeding 
on negligent— 
MR. KING: I never said anything about my theory. 
MR. BERRY: Every time you brought it out, you 
never plead it. 
THE COURT: I got some concerns, but under the 
circumstances, I'm going to let you bring it" in. We'll be in 
recess for five more minutes. Oh, while*we're on the record 
and the jury is out, Mr. Berry, do you want to state for the 
record your objection to Mr. King's exhibit? Is that Exhibit 
9, the Damage Summary? 
THE CLERK: It is. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 9. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Robert E. Conger 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Tel Tech, Inc. 
Defendant.) 
CASE NO. 82-7444 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
JANUARY 25, 1989 
1 THE COURT: I think under the circumstances, still 
2 the best way to do this is to allow the jury to come up with 
3 the total figure, and then deductions may be made by the 
4 Court rather than the jury. I think it's too confusing of a 
5 situation to allow the jury to try to make all the various 
6 appropriate deductions. Okay, anything else that needs to g 
7 on the record? 
8 MR. KING: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: We'll be in recess for five more 
10 minutes. 
11 (A recess was taken.) 
12 THE COURT: The record will reflect that all the 
13 members of the jury are in their places. 
14 You may proceed, Mr. King. 
15 MR. KING: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 REDIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
17 BY MR. KING: 
18 Q I'll restate the last question, Mr. Eilers. 
19 Based— 
20 MR. BERRY: Excuse me. Can I have a continuing 
21 objection on this question? 
22 THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. King? 
23 MR. KING: I think he made his record already* 
24 That's fine. 
25 THE COURT: All right, you may proceed. 
Q (BY MR. KING) Based on your experience and 
expertise and information you've read, depositions and other 
information you've learned about this case, do you have an 
opinion, Mr. Eilers, as to whether the spray ball system 
installed in the tanker, by Tel Tech in May of 1979, in this 
particular tanker was a defective and dangerous product? 
A Yes, I do, 
Q What is your opinion? 
A My opinion is that they created a hazardous 
condition on this piece of equipment. They should have 
recognized and done something, but they did create a hazard. 
A safety hazard. 
Q Would you — in what way was that hazardous? 
A First of all, they're installing a spray ball in 
the middle of a curved stainless steel vessel, and then 
they're leaving it there for the discretion of the individual 
who has to go up there and walk on it to apply the hose. And 
that in itself is a heavy hose, and they just created a very 
hazardous situation. 
Q Would you consider that hazardous condition to be a 
dangerous and defective product? 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to it as being 
repetitious. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure if he answered the 
question. You can answer that. 
3 
THE WITNESS: They did create a hazardous and 
dangerous situation. 
THE COURT: Well, answer it specifically if you 
can. 
Q (BY MR. KING) Let me ask the question again, and 
it requires a yes or no. Do you consider that this spray-
ball assembly in the manner in which it was installed without 
walk protection, do you tink it's a defective and dangerous 
product? 
A Yes, sir, I do. 
Q Does the particular manner in which a person who 
foreseeably is going to connect up the spray ball in the 
manner in which he's going to do that, make a difference as 
to whether this product is defective and unreasonably 
dangerous? 
A Yes, it does. The only way he can apply an 
installation or attach the hose is by going up the tank and 
walking out on the jacket, unless there is an overhead 
platform. And not all places have overhead platforms. And 
usually a piece of equipment is washed at the dairy right on 
the spot after they unload and they use the ladder to get up 
and down. And the way it was manufactured and installed, the 
only way he could get there was walking on that jacket, so 
they created a hazard. 
Q Can you have a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
36 
installation of a spray ball like that, even if you don't 
know what type or manner he's going to get up? 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object as to no 
foundation; still don't know how it's going to be used. 
THE COURT: Let me see. 
MR. KING: We're speaking to the product, not the 
use of it. 
THE COURT: Read that question back. 
(The pending question was read 
back. ) 
THE COURT: Yeah, he can answer that. Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. KING) Want me to rephrase it? 
A Please. 
Q Okay. You testified it's your opinion that the 
spray ball— 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to him leading the 
witness. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. KING: I'm not leading the witness. I'm 
recounting the testimony already— 
THE COURT: That's— 
MR. KING: — just to make it clear. 
THE COURT: Same thing. It's even worse. 
Sustained. 
MR. KING: All right. 
3 
Q (BY MR. KING) Let's see if we can make it as clear 
as possible. Is the defective and unreasonably dangerous 
character of this installation of spray balls by Tel Tech 
that you testified about, any less so, because the employees 
may have different ways to get up on the tank? 
A No, it's — they didn't necessarily know, I grant 
it, as to what different methods there were, but they planted 
an opening in the vessel, curved vessel, and they created a 
hazard and should have recognized that. 
Q Does the fact that the hazard may be known to users 
who operate the spray ball system, remove the defective and 
unreasonably dangerous character of that product? 
A No. 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, again objection. No proper 
foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. KING) What was your answer? 
A No. 
Q Who is in the best position, Mr. Eilers, from your 
experience and expertise as between the installer in this 
instance, Tel Tech, and someone who has to operate that spray 
ball system, such as Mr. Conger, to remedy the defective and 
unreasonably dangerous characteristics of this system? 
A The installer, definitely. 
Q Why? 
38 
A Because he is the person or the company that is 
making the installation. He is the first primary 
responsibility in that installation. 
Q Now, you read the testimony of the Telford's, and 
you said — and Mr. Toone. Based on that, do you have an 
opinion as to whether Tel Tech was aware of the particular 
circumstances that would — under which employees would 
likely use their spray ball system? 
A If they were aware? 
Q Yeah. I'll rephrase it. Is there any information 
in the material you read, that led you to believe or conclude 
that Tel Tech had any knowledge of how Meadow Gold or what 
equipment Meadow Gold had to service that? 
A There was no— 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I object to calling for 
speculation and conjecture. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. KING) Let me get back to one of the other 
depositions. Did you read the deposition of Don Dvorak? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q From that deposition, do you know of any 
specifications or directions or specification or direction 
that Meadow Gold gave Tel Tech as to how to do the spray ball 
installation? 
A No. What I read, Mr. Dvorak just said install the 
3 
spray balls. 
Q Okay. Now, that being your understanding, what is 
you.r opinion of what Tel Tech's responsibility was as far as 
the installation of this spray ball system in a proper and 
safe manner? 
A Given orders to install spray balls gave them the 
responsibility to keep that area safe, and they did net. 
Q And how could they have rectified or fixed the 
defe-ctive — or the defective condition of the hazard that 
existed? 
A They could have applied the grip strips that we've 
been talking about, or grip paint very easily, and eliminated 
the hazard that they created. 
Q Okay. Now let's assume that Tel Tech had done that 
and put some grip strips in the manner, generally, that you 
talked about on this tank here. Are you aware of any adverse 
results or conditions at all that would have been created? 
A No, sir. 
Q Any safety hazard that would have been created? 
A No, sir. 
Q Any problems for the use of the tank in a safe 
manner by Meadow Gold employees that would have been created? 
A No, sir. 
Q This stuff is black, right? Would the addition of 
these grip strips up on top of there change in some adverse 
40 
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(The following proceedings were 'held 
in camera.) 
THE COURT: This is Robert E. Conger versus Tel 
Tech, Inc., C82-7444. 
At the close of the plaintiffs case, the 
defendant's attorney, Mr. Berry, indicated that he had so mo 
motions to make, but that he would be willing to make these 
motions, if they could be heard at a later time with the 
same effect as if they were heard at the close of the 
plaintiff's evidence, and the plaintiff indicated that he 
would agree that they could be heard at a later time with 
that same effect. So we are ready to hear those motions 
now, Mr. Berry. 
MR. BERRY: Thank you, your Honor. 
Comes now the defendant, Tel Tech, Inc., and moves 
the Court at this time and place to direct a verdict in 
favor of Tel Tech and against the plaintiff as a matter of 
law upon the following grounds: 
The evidence adduced so far has not showed that we 
breached any duty owed to the plaintiff. Further, the Court 
allowed the plaintiff's expert, Mr. Eilers, to give an 
opinion that the product was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous. So during the course of trial, on the third day 
after this case has been pending since 1982, filed in 
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1 September in '81, the Court has now extended a new cause of 
2 action for strict liability beyond the four-year statute;. 
3 And further there is no evidence in this case to 
4 show that there has not been any substantial change in th~: 
5 product during the time involved. In other words, it is 
6 conjecture from that evidence whether or not there had been 
7 grip tape on there; whether or not it would have lasted a 
8 year, 18 months from the time of installation -- it was 
9 installed in May. 
10 Now let me go back and talk a little more in 
11 detail. Let's first of all talk about the doctrine of 
12 strict liability under 402(a). The law is fairly clear, as 
13 far as I have been able to research this subject in the 
14 past, and your Honor, even has helped me on this before, and 
15 I have always been under the idea that the doctrine of 
16 strict liability does not apply to one who supplies the 
17 service. Rather it applies to one who sells or to 
18 manufacturers and sellers. 
19 Now there is no evidence in this case to show that 
20 the spray ball didn't function exactly as they were 
21 designed. There is no evidence they were defective. What 
22 their claim is, and you can see that by cross-examination of 
23 Dr. Blotter, as well as his own expert witness -- what they 
24 were trying to show was the installation was defective and 
25 that made it unsafe. 
1 I The evidence in this case does not show that we 
2 I design tanks; we offer safety services of any kind. Rather, 
3 | it shows that we are merely engaged in the business of doing 
hilo arc welding with stainless steel. So we have been h-ld 
for failure to provide a service, I guess, to sell a product 
which we didn't sell. 
7 I As I see it, the case here would be a lot better 
8 I for the plaintiff if, say, you had the evidence before you 
9 | and we had supplied the grip tape, and it hadn't had as much 
10 I grip as Mr. Eilers says he'd like to have on it. If somehow 
11 I the guy had injured himself on the spray ball. 
12 | Now there's a law on that -- I have to adT.it you 
13 | kept me up a little bit last night on this -- and I'd like 
14 | to just kind of go over some of it with you, if I may,-so I 
15 | can make sure you understand my point. I thought I had a 
16 | case I wanted to — well, let's see if it starts in order 
17 | here. All right. 
18 I Elements of strict liability. The chattel which a 
19 | plaintiff must prove in a case involving strict liability 
20 | on tort actions is defective, and according to most 
21 | authorities, unreasonably dangerous condition of 
22 I defendant's product and a causal connection between such 
23 I condition and the plaintiff's injuries or damages. It is 
24 | also necessary to establish the defendant's connection with 
25 I the injury causing product, for example to show the 
1 defendant manufactured the product, sold the product to the 
2 plaintiff or in some other way delivered it. 
3 Well, that's basically the principal and a ion of 
4 courts have cured the application of strict liability. 
5 Here's an Illinois case Abel vs. General Motors. It is 155 
6 Illinoise App.3rd 208. It is 507 N.E.2nd at 1369, and t-\at 
7 is a case involving a situation where an automobi le -dealer 
8 installed a tire on the vehicle. There was no claim the 
9 tire was defective; only the claim that installation was 
10 defective. The Illinois Court of Appeals in that case held 
11 that -- this is a 1987 case -- that it did not apply to the 
12 installation. 
13 THE COURT: How did they install it defective? 
14 MR. BERRY: What? 
15 THE COURT: How did they misinstall it? Oid they 
16 leave some nuts off? 
17 MR. BERRY: I forget. 
18 MR. Berry: I have got another Oregon case here 
19 that I wanted to find. 
20 THE COURT: You know, I had a case here recently 
21 where they — it was an installation of a sprinkling system, 
22 and the claim of the plaintiff was that it was a defective 
23 installation. And the question was whether strict product 
24 liability applies. I looked at quite a lot of cases, and 
25 as I recall the law — what I finally decided that it was, 
you have to kind of look at the predominant thing: Are they 
really predominantly selling a product, and the installation 
is incidental? Are they primarily selling some service, and 
the product is kind of thrown in? 
MR. BERRY: Your situation appears obviously very 
distinguishable. To begin with, if the seller installed tne 
sprinkling system, would be part of the sale. The product 
sold and the doctrine would be applicable. However, in our 
case that is not it. We do not manufacture. We do not sell 
tanks. We are simply welders, and so now we are being held 
for what is allegedly a defective tank because it didn't 
have grip strips on, which we neither sold, delivered nor 
manufactured. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BERRY: Here's another case. This is a 
Colorado case. It is Yarbro Y.A.R.B.R.O. vs. Hilton Hotels. 
It is found in 655 P.2d ai 822. It is out of the Supreme 
Court of Colorado. It is an En Banc, and the case there 
holds that one who supplies services is not liable under the 
doctrine of strict liability. They were, in this case, 
trying to seek to hold some suppliers of services by 
architects, contractors and engineers and inspector under 
the strict liability law, and they said that is not 
applicable to those types of people. 
Utah has previously considered this situation, 
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years ago, before we adopted strict liability. But ther^ is 
a cass in Utah, dibblee vs. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints 
Hospital, 12 Ut2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085. In this Dibblee case, 
a hospital patient was given a blood transfusion. The 
decedent claimed a breach of implied warranty on the vial of 
blood. The Court disagreed, holding that a transfusion 
could not i>e classified as a sale in any conventional sens -
and held it was merely a service. 
THE COURT: That was a real old case. 
MR. BERRY: »61. It is quite an old case. I nave 
not read anything since, that says to the contrary. There 
are some later cases. 
THE COURT: That's a U.C.C. warranty? 
MR. BERRY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Question there — 
MR. 3ERRY: Well, here it is kind of interesting. 
Under the U.C.C. we also have a four-year statute of 
limitations. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BERRY: It is kind of an interesting --
THE COURT: I doubt if there is a U.C.C. warranty 
claim here. 
MR. BERRY: Well, I do too, but it is an injury 
claim is what he has got. Let me go ahead and read this 
other case. Bolduc vs. Herbert Schneider Corporation is a 
New Hampshire case. It is a 1977 case. It is 374 A.2d 
1187, and in that a ski operator was held — was not the 
manufacturer of a ski lift. He only provides service. Tne 
court held strict liability as well as implied warranty 
theories inapplicable because of service, not a product was 
at issue. 
In a similar case, Wagner vs. Coronet Ho^el, 10 
Arizona App. 296; 458 P.2d 390, 1969, the plaintiff Wagner-
sustained injuries while taking a shower, when the shower 
mat, which he was standing on, lost its suction. Plaintiff 
brought an action against the mat manufacturer and against 
the hotel on a product liability theory of liability. The 
Court said the relationship between plaintiff, a paying 
guest in the hotel, was that of inviter and invitee; that 
the hotel cannot be liable under a theory of strict 
liability and tort. 
THE COURT: Well, because they hadn't sold the 
bath mat to the person? 
MR. BERRY: Well, I guess they supplied it to the 
room to use, but they said it still didn't apply. 
I have got some more. I have a better case than 
this. 
THE COURT: This Abel case you showed "me, I do 
think in this case they owed them any product at all. They 
gave a lady a tune up, adjusted her linkage. When she got 
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in her car it lurched forward and took of. They said it 
does not apply because it is a service and not a sale of a 
good. I am not sure that's right. I not sure that's 
directly applicable to this situation. 
MR. BERRY: Let me go on here again. Here's a 
case out of Oregon. Case is Davis vs Pacific Diesel Power 
et al. It is 41 Oregon 598 P.2d 1223. It is 1979 case from 
the Court of Appeals of Oregon. This was an action against 
a supplier of a diesel engines for wrongful death and 
personal injuries suffered by workers due to emissions of 
carbon monoxide by diesel-powered compressor into their air 
supply. 
The court held it did not err in denying 
plaintiffs' motion for new trial on the basis of misconduct 
allegedly due to the jury's apparent misunderstanding of the 
law of concurrent causation. 
Then the Court went on to say: 
"In negligence actions against supplier of 
diesel engines for wrongful death and personal 
injuries suffered by worker due to emission of 
carbon monoxide by diesel-powered compressor into 
the air supply, evidence was fox the jury on the 
issues of supplier's negligence in returning to 
workers' employer, for workers' use, compressor 
unit which had allegedly inoperable engine water 
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high temperature switch; in allegedly failing to 
properly test automatic shut down system; in 
allegedly causing arm and/or plunger on compressor's 
solenoid to become bent; and allegedly failing to 
properly wire safety switches on automatic shut-off 
system." 
And the Court said: "In actions in strict 
liability against supplier of diesel engine for 
wrongful death and personal injuries suffered by 
workers due to emission of carbon monoxide by 
diesel-powered compressor into their air supply, 
workers must have proved that supplier sold their 
employer a product that was defective and 
unreasonbly dangerous. 
"In actions against the supplier of diesel 
engine for wrongful death and personal injuries 
suffered by workers due to emission of carbon 
monoxide by diesel-powered compressor in their air 
supply, trail court did not err in striking workers1 
strict liability count while workers' complaints 
alleged that the compressor unit, rather than the 
rebuilt engine supplied by supplier, was dangerously 
defective and unreasonbly dangerous due to failure of 
supplier to install functional cutoff unit when 
installing engine in its compressor." 
OX-
1 THE COURT: That sounds like it's kind of on 
2 point. 
3 MR. BERRY: It is right dead on point. I nave act 
4 another one or two here, judge. I am just getting warmed 
5 up. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
7 MR. 3ERRY: Now, here's another one from Idaho. 
8 Involves an aircraft accident and co-owner pilot of an 
9 airplane, his wife, and other owner, brought an action 
10 against the airplane repair company and two of its 
11 employees to recover for damages to plane and injuries 
12 suffered by the pilot when the plane crashed after a wing 
13 strut broke, following a visual inspection of airplane by 
14 the employees and following the employees' approval of a 
15 ferry flight to bring the airplane to repair company's place 
16 of business for future repairs. 
17 In this case the Court held co-owner pilot of 
18 airplane, who was injured in crash, could not recover from 
19 company, or its employees, which had made repairs to the 
20 aircraft, which had given it a visual inspection and 
21 approved it for the ferry flight for further repairs on the 
22 theory of strict liability in tort. 
23 And they went on to remark in that case, which we 
24 said once before in this case, the "fundamental component in 
25 a negligence action is existence of a duty toward another 
1 and breach thereof.11 
2 Well, what T have been telling you the evidence in 
3 this case is, as far as strict liability is concerned, does 
4 not show the breach of any duty at all. This should go 
5 against my people only on negligence and proximate cause, 
6 and maybe you can call it contributory negligence and 
7 proximate cause; that those are the only issues we pled. 
8 Further the action was filed in 1982, and T forget 
9 the date without looking at it, under section 78-12-25. Has 
10 a four-year statute of limitations. 
11 What the Court has done by allowing amendments 
12 during the third day of the trial, some eight years after 
13 the accident, is apparently waived the statute of 
14 limitations. 
15 I admit that T suspected that Mr. King was going 
16 to try and use strict liability, but he never filed a 
17 pleading, but his questions showed that. But since he never 
18 moved to amend, I didn't go ahead, then, and seek to do 
19 anything as far as depose anybody down at the place to find 
20 out how they were misusing. We certainly could have 
21 developed the facts that they were not given proper 
22 instructions — that's Mr. Conger and other employees -- as 
23 to how to service the tanker when it comes in the milk 
24 receiving depot. Certainly they should have set up proper 
25 procedures, when they didn't. If you don't set up proper 
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procedures, this can certainly be misused. 
Then we have another thing that just makes this 
case totally conjectural. We have the situation where we 
have testimony that the tank installation was made, I mink, 
on May 4th of '79. The accident happened five years — not 
five but, well, it is about 18 months later on January 1st, 
'81. So we have a situation where the thing has been in 
service and we have testimony from Mr. Filers and others 
that this is a very caustic environment; that chemicals will 
cause the grip strip to come loose. Chemicals also may not 
be the only cause. You can have a high pressure water hose 
washing and cleaning down the tank. 
We have a situation here also where you could 
certainly say that nobody really knows. It is total 
speculation and conjecture. Even if a grip strip had beon 
put on there, whether or not it would have done anything in 
the way of avoiding this accident five years later. Then on 
top of that --
THE COURT: Well, that may be true, but thatfs 
something for the jury to think about. You know, not as a 
matter of law, I don't think that's a factual --. 
MR. BERRY: Well, it is conjectural. You don't 
allow them to speculate. There's nobody that's said that. 
And of course if you go on ahead in that posture, you know 
—• now, how the case seems to me that we have got to move 
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1 the Court. And if you deny this motion to amend the verdict 
2 form, because we've got to, then, submit- some additional 
3 issues to the jury. 
4 Well, what has happened now is you have had Mr. 
5 Eilers tell the Court what law he'd like to apply, the I^A7 
6 of strict liability. He has decided wnat the law will be. 
7 There is no foundation to know he is qualified to determine 
8 the law, but he has. 
9 Well, after he did that, I put Dr. Blotter back 
10 on, as you recall, and he testified that the part that we 
11 sold was not defective. And it is perfectly evident from 
12 the evidence the spray ball did not cause the injury. It is 
13 a matter in which Mr. Conger tried to reach it. 
14 So if you consider the product is the component 
15 system, you have one person saying one supplied the 
16 compound, the spray bottles didn't spray and is defective 
17 and unreasonably dangerous product. You have another expert 
18 from California who says they did. You have a factual issue 
19 right there. You don't have any definition in the 
20 instructions. 
21 So far we have prepared one, and I might say I 
22 have got Rick Van Wagoner working on some additional 
23 instructions and additional form of the verdict, in case you 
24 don't grant my motion to strike the claim of strict 
25 liability, and instruct the jury on that, evidence has been 
•iS. 
stricken, and I am going to get that over as soon as we can 
find a live body over in the office to type it up. The 
jury has got to be told what is a manufacturer. Theyfve got 
to be told what is misconduct. They have got to be told 
what substantial change is. I am not prepared to address 
those points during trial, toward the end of trial, and so I 
think I was certainly unduly surprised on the part of Mr. 
King here, in trying to get an opinion out of Mr. Eilers 
that the product was defective and unreasonbiy dangerous 
when that doctrine should not apply to a supplier of 
service. 
THE COURT: Ifll tell you where I am at this 
point. I think that I ruled yesterday that I am going to 
allow him to amend his complaint. It is true I hadn't 
thought about the statute of limitations issue. Even after 
having thought about that, I don't think there is probable 
surprise here that I am going to throw the product liability 
claim out because it hadn't been pled. I may be wrong on 
that, but I frequently am wrong on things. 
The case he has here, Mr. King, concerns me quite 
a bit. I need to get you to respond to that because it 
seems to be the case that it says -- involving the tire --
seem to be pretty much on point. Also seems to make sense. 
So I want you to respond to that one. I am concerned about 
that issue. 
-L6-
1 MR. KING: I have a number of things to say in 
2 response, your Honor, particularly about the supplies issue. 
3 THE COURT: You donft need to talk about that. 
4 You win on that one. 
5 MR. KING: Okay. On this Davis case, just from 
6 what I can see, and I haven't had a chance to read much more 
7 than the headnotes and some of the claims here, but it 
8 appears to me there that the defendants -- the Court says 
9 the defendant's action included both a sale of a rebuilt 
10 engine for the compressor and the installation of the engine 
11 in the compressor. It is not, however, the rebuilt engine 
12 that the defendant sold which was defective, but a 
13 compressor that was emitting carbon monoxide. 
14 THE COURT: Focus on the case they cited there 
15 instead of the airplane. It is a little simpler. Involves 
16 a tire. They sold the tire. 
17 MR. KING: Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: They didn't tighten the lug nuts up. 
19 The guy is injured. The tire comes off. They seek strict 
20 product liability. The whole thing. The way you installed 
21 it was defective. The Court said no, the tire was fine. 
22 It may be that after they did it, the whole car 
23 was defective. The whole system was defective because of 
24 the way they installed, but the thing they actually sold, 
25 the tire, was not defective; therefore, your only claim is 
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1 for negligence in installation, not for strict product 
2 liability with the tire. 
3 Then it analogized that in selling the engine and 
4 failing to hook up the compressor right, or put on the 
5 safety device or some kind of cutoff switch or something 
6 — but they say the engine is okay. The part that you sold 
7 itself is okay. iMaybe the whole system, once you sold it, 
8 was defective, but that's a service — the installation, 
9 not the product itself. It seems to be right on point. 
10 MR. KING: I can see that type of analysis. What 
11 I was establishing, I think, and what was established on the 
12 record through Carl Eilers is, that in the same way that a 
13 lathe or some piece of equipment that's sold by the 
14 defendant, put into a warehouse or industry without a guari 
15 is defective, because of the piece of equipment necessarily 
16 used with that lathe, but not for the purpose of the lathe, 
17 but to protect those who are going to use the lathe. When 
18 it is absent, the law is well established that the design oi 
19 the lathe, in not having the protective piece of equipment, 
20 that the defendant knows is reasonably necessary to prevent 
21 hazards, that design is a defective design. 
22 We are not talking about manufacturing defects 
23 here, and I think that's the difference between this case 
24 and the tire case. What he was trying to say there is that 
25 they put it, the tire, on wrong, and it was defective 
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because they didn't screw these bolts on. You are right. 
That's a service. 
Here, what Carl was saying, and T think what the 
evidence established, is they had a system for cleaning out 
these tankers that they sold to Meadow Gold. There's no 
doubt they are liable as a seller. We did not talk about 
manufacturer in this case. That's not an issue under strict 
liability in the same way the seller of that piece of 
equipment that's put into the plant without a guard, and 
somebody gets sucked into it, is strict liability. And I 
think that's where I am coming from. Those walk strips are 
exactly like the guard on the lathe or whatever piece of 
equipment. They weren't there. And the absence of their 
presence there, that absence is the defect in the design of 
the spray ball system that was sold to them. 
THE COURT: Okay. T think I understand your 
position. 
.MR. BERRY: I don't think his argument is sound. 
Again, keep in mind we only sold spray balls. We weren't 
employed to design for safety. We weren't employed and 
consulted for safety. We were not involved at all in doing 
anything except installing the spray ball. That we did, and 
it worked perfectly. There is nothing to indicate that was 
wrong. 
Now, what he's trying to say is, I guess, on some 
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of these, like in that case that maybe you install one that 
has no guard on it, maybe your middle man — you buy it 
from a manufacturer and you go ahead and install that, 
well, you are really selling it on to the buyer. So I can 
see on those kind of cases where it would apply if he 
doesn't have a guard on. But I have never heard of anybodv 
having a d\ity to put a guard on a lathe that installs it, 
if it "doesn't have one on it. You install a machine that 
is ordered. This is a rather interesting case, but I just 
can't see for the life of me how strict liability applies. 
MR. KING: I think you are aware of my position, 
Judge, if I can respond more. 
THE COURT: Boy, I'll tell you --
MR. KING: It is just like a guard. I have had 
strict liability cases like this before. I had one where 
the — what are those motors called -- horizontal -- they 
are on oil well rigs? The — I forget. 
MR. BERRY: I don't know which motor you are 
thinking of. 
MR. KING: Well, it is the big horizontal thing. 
You have got a cat head on it. Do you know what I mean? 
MR. BERRY: They are big diesel rotary type 
engines. 
MR. KING: Any way, I have had those cases where 
they are all — they're installed by someone, sold by 
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someone, installed on oil wells and there was no guard. 
Never had been. These people never had any reason to put a 
guard on, and my guy got sucked into it and chewed up. The 
evidence showed had there been a guard, would not have had 
the strict liability applied in that case. And I think 
there is a number of cases that T could find, your Honor, 
but I frankly haven't, but I would be happy to do that 
supplementally. 
THE COURT: I have no doubt there are cases like 
that. 
MR. KING: They are very similar to this one. I 
think that's kind of what we are looking at. This is 
unusual because the grip strips certainly are something tha 
go on the existing tanker, but T don't see the purpose of 
the theory that there is any difference whatsoever between 
this and the lack of a guard. It is the design that T have 
criticized, and Tel Tech is the seller of that design. 
MR. BERRY: We did not sell the design. 
MR. KING: Sure they did. 
THE COURT: That's sort of a factual question. 
MR. KING: Yes. It is a factual question. You 
know what the terms of the contract meant. If Meadow Gold 
gave him some instructions and the jury wants to believe 
that, then I lost. If Meadow Gold says: Put them in. It 
is up to you. We are relying on you. We have evidence on 
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1 the record now, in those circumstances, that's what a seller 
2 of that kind of product does, is put in those walk strips to 
3 avoid that hazard. 
4 THE COURT: It may be they didn't even sell 
5 anything. Lots of times Meadow Gold gave them the parts. 
6 They just put them in. 
7 MR. KING: Well, they can believe that if they 
8 want. Ray put the evidence in. They sold it for 178 bucks. 
9 I didn't do that. Ray did. We do have evidence in the 
10 record; quite a bit of it from Telfords themselves, that: 
11 they were in the business of selling equipment to dairies. 
12 Now, they are in the business of selling, and they are a 
13 business person, in the business of selling. That's one of 
14 the definitional thresholds for strict liability. 
15 THE COURT: I will tell you, I think this Davis 
16 vs. Pacific Diesel Power Company case is right on point. I 
17 think there may be some guard cases that are pretty close to 
18 it; a fine line, but I think this Oregon case is persuasive 
19 to me. It is persuasive to me. 
20 MR. KING: They weren't criticizing the design 
21 there, your Honor. They weren't criticizing the design of 
22 Davis or that tire case. It wasn't the design of the wheel. 
23 The wheel case would be relevant and right on point if, as 
24 part of a wheel assembly, that these people had sold and 
25 installed that. They did not include adequate number of 
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1 bolt lugs to put on, and that because of that, the wheel 
2 fell off. There was nothing about the design of the number 
3 of lug nuts in that case that caused the wheel to fall off. 
4 It is because these guys didn't screw them on. That design 
5 was there. 
6 THE COURT: The thing is what they sold. The 
7 spray ball was not defective. The product was not 
8 defective. Now, once it was in, the whole tanker may have 
9 been defective, but the thing they sold was not defective. 
10 MR. KING: Well, the point is they were selling a 
11 cleaning system. I think this is argument, your Honor. 
12 This is issues of fact. He can argue all they sold was a 
13 spray ball. I am arguing what they sold is a method for 
14 cleaning out these tankers, and that that necessarily 
15 includes a spray ball, and the way to safely service it. 
16 THE COURT: Well — 
17 MR. KING: The fact that the grate strips, you 
18 know, aren't part of the actual function of the wash, and 
19 spray ball is no less -- no more significant or n"o more 
20 reason why you should throw out strict liability than the 
21 absence of a guard on this piece of equipment to the 
22 function of that piece of equipment. Every one of those 
23 design cases on guards go -- every one of them — that piece 
24 of equipment worked perfectly; does its job. It cuts; 
25 whatever it does. But there is a hazard exposed to the 
J i 
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1 user. 
2 THE COURT: You know, I ought to be gun shy in 
3 this case. I have already been slapped down by the apellate 
4 court on it, but I have to agree with the Oregon case, and I 
5 think it is on point. I am going to grant the motion as to 
6 strict liability and submit it on negligence only. 
Do you need to say anything else on the record 
8 before Nora goes? 
9 MR. KING: Can I read something here out of the 
10 402 A comment? 
11 THE COURT: Sure. 
12 MR. KING: As you know, 402 A(l), says: 
13 "One who sells a product in a defective 
14 condition unreasonbly dangerous to the user or 
15 consumer or to his property is subject to 
16 liability. . . if. 
17 "The seller is engaged in the business of 
18 I selling such a product" — which is undisputed 
19 here that they sold the product. We may have a 
20 factual issue as to what the product is. But 
21 that1s all. 
22 Number B. "It is expected to and does reach 
23 the user or consumer without substantial change 
24 in the condition in which it was sold." 
25 He is arguing it refers of that. He has got it 
.££• 
1 all confused. He is saying, well, these grip strips might 
2 have washed off. The point that it got to them without any 
3 grip strips and remained in exactly the same condition 
4 until he got hurt, that's what strict liability is all 
5 about. 
6 Then the business of selling, under Comment f: 
7 "It therefore applies to any manufacturer of 
8 such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer 
9 or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant. 
10 Tt is not necessary that the seller be engaged 
11 solely in the business of selling such product." 
12 Comment g: "The burden of proof that the 
13 product was in a defective condition at the time 
14 that it left the hands of the particular seller 
15 is upon the injured plaintiff. 
16 "Safe condition at the time of the delivery 
17 by the seller, will, however include proper 
18 packaging, necessary sterilization, and other 
19 precautions required to permit the product to 
20 remain safe for a normal length of time when 
21 handled in a normal manner." 
22 And they go on and talk about the package, for 
23 example, has nothing to do with whether the cereal you eat 
24 is performing its job of giving you some neutrition. If 
25 your package has got a piece of glass sticking out of it, o 
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1 whatever, you have got to have the defective condition 
2 addressed to those types of hazards which are going to 
3 foreseeably be by people using them. 
4 This is Comment h: 
5 "The defective condition may arise not only 
6 from harmful ingredients, not characteristic of 
7 the product itself either as to presence or 
3 quantity, but also from foreign objects contained 
9 in the product from decay or deterioration for 
10 sale, or from the way in which the product is 
11 prepared or packed. No reason is apparent for 
12 distinguishing between the product itself and 
13 the container in which it is supplied; and the 
14 two were purchased by the user or consumer as an 
15 integrated whole. Where the container itself is 
16 dangerous, the product is sold in a defective 
17 condi tion." 
18 Finally, "It is no doubt to be expected" — this 
19 is under the part of Component Parts — "that where there is 
20 no change in the component part itself, but it is merely 
21 incorporated into something larger, the strict liability 
22 will be found to carry through to the ultimate user." 
23 THE COURT: Say that again. That other stuff 
24 didn't seem to be applicable, but what was that again? That 
25 sounds kind of — 
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MR. KING: "It is no doubt to be expected 
that where there.is no change in the component part 
itself, but it is merely incorporated into something 
larger, the strict liability will be found to carry 
through to the ultimate user or consumer." 
Admittedly, this is Comments to 402 A and 
they have never been changed since the 1970s or '50s 
actually. This is old law. And I am sure, like I say, I 
can find numerous cases on a similar theory with guarding cr 
other types of precautions that have to be sold with, 
attached to, in a container of, or any other kind of 
accompanying method or matter accompanying a product that's 
doing its job. But the hazard that is present to the user 
in the manner, when you misuse the product -- and that's 
what these early restatement comments are going to -- and 
the law has developed clearly in that line, I think the 
Court's ruling is error and I think it is reversable error, 
but I think I have said enough. 
I do want to make, your Honor, one more point, 
though, while we are on this. 
I don't think my comments earlier on this point 
were on the record, and I do want to make something on the 
record on this. Even though I think you have agreed in 
point, this is not a surprise to Mr. Barry. He asked Mr. 
Eilers, in his deposition last year, about what his claims 
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were, and Mr, Eilers clearly said the product was dangerous. 
They created a hazardous condition a hazardous product. Mr. 
Barry submitted jury instructions on January 17th, which 
incorporated three or four specific definitional 
instructions of a seller of a dangerous and defective 
product. It is right out of 402 A. 
He also submitted instructions on assumption of 
risk, misuse of product, all these things that go to the 
hazardous nature of the product, and we have talked about 
that during trial. And he has admitted that he anticipated 
that, and yet he never made a claim to this Court — he got 
my jury instructions, which clearly set forth strict 
liability negligence, and never objected, never said a word 
until Carl Eilers was asked that ultimate question. I think 
this is being set up to make it look like it was a surprise, 
and it is not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KING: I have said enough. 
THE COURT: I ought to say again for the record, 
that I granted Mr. Barry's motion to dismiss the product 
liability claim but not on the issue of surprise or failure 
to plead. 
Thank you. 
(Proceedings in camera concluded.) 
a^a. 
ADDENDUM E 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective m its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
